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This paper investigates the implications of the venture capital (VC) investor type (govern-
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1 Introduction1
Despite the seemingly modest volumes of venture capital (VC) investments in comparison to the2
rest of capital flows, the consequences of such financing are quite substantial (Lerner, 1999, 2002b,3
2009). In terms of innovation, Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that VC-backed firms are char-4
acterized by significantly higher patenting rates in comparison to their non-VC-backed peers. In5
the same vein, Davila et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between the growth of start-ups,6
as measured by the labor growth, and the VC funding. At the macroeconomic level, Samila and7
Sorenson (2011) document a highly positive impact that the supply of VC has on business cre-8
ation, employment, and aggregate income in the US. In terms of performance, VC-backed firms9
display better chances of IPO and survival rates after an IPO (Hochberg et al., 2007; Puri and10
Zarutskie, 2012). The operating performance of VC-backed firms also seems to be superior to11
the performance of comparable non-VC-backed companies (Alperovych and Hübner, 2013). These12
arguments outline the existence of the added value of venture capital financing.13
Many governments sharing this conviction about the benefits of VC activity have introduced14
programs to foster venture capital financing. These initiatives may take three general forms:15
regulatory framework ("law"), indirect framework, and direct investment schemes (Keuschnigg and16
Nielsen, 2001; Cumming, 2007; Cumming and Li, 2013). The "law" mainly relates to taxation and17
institutional frameworks in which venture capitalists and entrepreneurial firms operate. Indirect18
frameworks include programs that favor technology transfers from universities to business, creation19
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and support of business incubators, and structuring industrial sectors in clusters. Finally, the20
"direct investment schemes" mainly focus on the supply side of the market. These schemes may21
be broken down into three types: (i) the guarantee system, in which the government commits to22
covering, totally or partially, potential losses of private VC funds, (ii) the fund-of-funds system,23
where the government co-invests together with private VC funds, and (iii) the direct investments in24
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by government-sponsored venture capital (GVC) investment25
funds. In this paper, we focus on this third vector of public influence in the VC world.126
Various studies have investigated country-specific settings of different forms of government-27
sponsored VC, as in the US (Lerner, 1999; Cumming and Li, 2013), Canada (Cumming and28
MacIntosh, 2003, 2006, 2007), UK and Germany (Cumming, 2003; Heger et al., 2005; Sunley et al.,29
2005; Bascha and Walz, 2006), Australia (Cumming, 2007; Lerner and Watson, 2008; Cumming and30
Johan, 2009), Finland (Maula et al., 2007), and on a pan-European basis (Leleux and Surlemont,31
2003; Rin et al., 2006; Cumming et al., 2013). International evidence of the effects of GVC on32
investment patterns and exit performance is documented by Cumming et al. (2013) and Brander33
et al. (2014).34
None of the aforementioned papers investigates the transformation process of inputs into out-35
puts (i.e. the firm’s operating efficiency). Rather they focus on GVC-funded firms’ output levels36
such as growth in sales revenues and/or labor, patents, returns, or exit patterns. Yet efficiency is a37
substantial determinant of firm performance (Bottazzi et al., 2008a), and there is recent evidence38
that it is itself positively impacted by VC backing (Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013).39
One may thus wonder where the source of this impact comes from. Our paper contributes to40
answering this question. Using the case of Belgium, we investigate whether the impact of investor41
type can be observed upstream from the output, directly in firm productivity. Specifically, we use42
operating efficiency as a metric in order to contribute to the debate on the impact of VC funds’43
"origin" - government or private - on firm performance.44
Just as private VC investors, GVC funds face the issues of selection of right targets, and coach-45
1See Lerner (1999), Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001), and Lerner (2009) for an extensive discussion on the theo-
retical rationale for public intervention in the VC industry.
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ing portfolio firms in their growth and development. Even though their global objective is probably46
not only profit maximization, but also job creation and stabilization of regional economic activ-47
ity, ensuring that the provided funds are properly allocated and used efficiently by their portfolio48
firms is still incumbent upon the management of such funds. In light of the recent criticism that49
governments often fail in this task (Shane, 2009), a thorough analysis of the implications of GVC50
financing on efficiency becomes worthwhile and instructive. Our general research question is there-51
fore formulated as follows: How do differences in types of venture capital investors (GVC/PVC)52
affect the post-investment efficiency of their portfolio firms?53
To address this question, we have gathered data on 515 Belgian venture capital deals during54
the period 1998-2007. To enhance our analysis, we subsequently investigate the question whether55
VC-backed firms in Belgium are more or less efficient than their comparable non-VC-backed (NVC)56
peers, again focusing on the GVC-PVC investor dichotomy. For this purpose, we start from the57
entire population of Belgian firms to construct the control group of similar firms that are not58
subject to any form of VC financing.59
To estimate efficiency, we rely on Dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis (DDEA) models (Färe60
and Grosskopf, 1996; Tone and Tsutsui, 2010). Rooted in the data envelopment analysis (DEA)61
literature, it draws on the microeconomic theory of firms’ optimizing behavior. In this sense, it62
has stronger theoretical foundations than accounting ratios (Cook and Seiford, 2009). Practically63
speaking, for each VC-backed or comparable firm, we estimate a global efficiency score, bounded64
between 0 and, 1 over the four year time window spanning from the pre-transaction2 year to three65
years post-transaction. The higher the score, the more efficiently a firm uses its inputs to produce66
outputs. The global efficiency score is then decomposed into term efficiencies, which show the67
evolution of efficiency over time. We next use the estimated scores in a regression setting to assess68
the impact of the VC investor type on the efficiency of the firm.69
Our findings indicate that within the cohort of VC-backed firms, efficiency increases following70
the VC injection. This result, however, is not uniformly split between GVC- and PVC-backed71
portfolio firms. The univariate global, as well as the term efficiency scores, show that Belgian72
2The terms transaction, injection, or deal are used interchangeably and denote the time of VC investment.
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GVC-backed firms lag behind their privately-backed peers in terms of productivity. Having a73
GVC investor in the firms’ equity results in substantial reductions of global efficiency over the74
four year study window. Factoring comparable NVC-backed firms into the analysis suggests that75
GVC-backed portfolio companies lag even behind their comparable peers. At the same time, we76
find no effect of PVC funding on productivity, when compared to the NVC-backed firms.377
These results shed new light on existing evidence on the impact of VC financing on efficiency,78
and sometimes contradicts it. The study by Chemmanur et al. (2011) suggests that VC-backed79
firms are more efficient than non-VC-backed firms both prior and after VC financing. Our results80
show that the differential effect of VC backing in Belgium mostly results from productivity de-81
struction from GVC rather than an improvement due to PVC. Besides, we confirm the documented82
findings that VC improves the productivity of the targets after the first financing event, consistent83
with Croce et al. (2013). At the same time, the type of VC clearly matters as well. Being financed84
by a GVC fund seems hinder this improvement in productivity, firm’s efficiency remaining below85
even the level of NVC-backed firms.86
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical design.87
Section 3 outlines the methodology and data used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the results.88
Finally section 5 concludes.89
2 Background and theoretical design90
2.1 Venture capital financing and efficiency91
A large body of the literature posits that besides returns (Cochrane, 2005; Hand, 2007; Korteweg92
and Sørensen, 2010), VC also stimulates growth, spurs innovation, and creates jobs both at firm93
3A plausible counter-argument may suggest that since GVC funds have objectives like job creation and stabiliza-
tion of the economic environment, it is inappropriate to make cross-firm comparisons on the basis of productivity
only. To an extent, we counter this with a side examination of the job creation with respect to the investor type.
These analyses indicate that GVC-backed portfolio companies failed to create more jobs than their privately-backed
peers with the resources at their disposal. This indicates that the capacities of generating added value and creating
more jobs complement each other, and are not substitutable in our sample and echoes the theoretical ideas of
Jovanovic (1982), who suggests the positive link between the efficiency, survival, and growth of firms. Due to space
limitations we do not present these results in the main text but they are available upon request.
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and economy levels (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Samila and Sorenson, 2011; Puri and Zarutskie,94
2012). The mechanisms through which VC financiers produce value are selection and value adding95
(Alperovych and Hübner, 2013). First, VC investors carefully pick their targets using stringent96
screening criteria Tyebjee and Bruno (1984); Macmillan et al. (1985, 1987) and scrutiny in the97
selection process. This allows them to significantly reduce the information asymmetries around98
potential qualifiers prior the initial investment (Lerner, 2002b; Knockaert et al., 2006). Second, VC99
investors closely monitor, control, and involve themselves actively in their portfolio firms after the100
financing takes place (Sapienza et al., 1994; Bottazzi et al., 2008b). Monitoring and control efforts101
by VC investors include (but are not limited to) the board representation (Lerner, 1995), staging102
of capital infusions (Lerner, 1995; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003), and use of convertible securities103
to name but a few (Hellmann, 1998, 2006). Similarly, advisory and involvement services could104
involve the internal restructuring of the management teams and their compensation structures105
(Sapienza, 1992), assistance in the strategic and operational management (Hellmann and Puri,106
2000), professionalization, headhunting and additional fundraising (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). VC107
investors also heavily capitalize on their network of contacts to enhance the scale and empower the108
growth of the ventures they fund (Hsu, 2000; Davila et al., 2003; Hochberg et al., 2007). Finally, the109
reputation and experience of VC sponsors play a critical role in facilitating growth and certifying110
the quality of a venture (Gompers, 1996; Sørensen, 2007). Combining these effects results in a111
more efficient allocation of resources, which implies improvements in a firm-level productivity and112
thus superior efficiency of VC-backed firms (Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013).113
2.2 Venture capital investor type and efficiency114
Improvements in productivity (as well as other benefits) can only be achieved if screening and115
value added mechanisms are properly implemented and enforced. This translates into constraints116
VC funds are subject to. These latter, however, may vary depending on the type of VC investor117
(Lerner, 2002b).118
PVC investors are subject to strong contractual, financial and reputation constraints coming119
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from the institutions (called limited partners, LPs) VC firms raise money from (Florin, 2005;120
Bottazzi et al., 2008b). Contractual pressure is related to the complex partnership agreements,121
which govern the business relations between LPs and managers of VC funds. Gompers and Lerner122
(1996) characterize three broad classes of restrictions (covenants) pertaining to the overall fund123
management, to the activities of fund managers, and to the types of targets in which the fund is124
allowed to invest. Violation of these clauses results in penalties applied to PVC fund managers,125
which limits the potential for agency conflicts and costs associated with them.126
Financial pressure is related to the strong return requirements and compensation structures.127
Return hurdles, coupled with a fund’s limited lifetime forces fund managers to discontinue the128
financing of underperforming investments and adopt a clearly observable exit-oriented investment129
strategy (Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Lerner et al., 2007). At the same time, the compensation130
structures of PVC funds (management fees and carried interest) are closely linked to the outcomes131
of their investments policies (Jensen, 1986; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Metrick and Yasuda, 2010).132
This also should force the fund managers to exert a considerable effort in selection, monitoring,133
and value-adding activities (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; Bottazzi et al., 2008b).134
Reputation pressure is related to violations of the contractual agreements and failures to deliver135
sufficient financial returns to limited partners (LPs). Since VC investors recursively raise funds136
as part of their business activity, LPs are unlikely to commit their capital to a VC firm with137
a poor track record (Gompers, 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Such constraints force PVC138
managers with limited financial and overseeing resources to ensure that funds they provide to139
the entrepreneurial firms are properly allocated, and that moral hazard problems at the investee140
level are addressed, in order to maximize the overall exit value of their portfolios (de Clercq and141
Manigart, 2007).142
GVC funds are largely exempt from such pressures. In general, they use or leverage public143
money for their operations and their lifetime is often unlimited. Although it is possible that these144
funds have statutory life-span limitations, Lerner (2009) argues that once introduced, these funds145
often become very difficult to "kill off". Their activity is unlikely to be governed by a limited146
partnership-like agreement. They are not subject to stringent financial return requirements and147
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have no clearly defined exit strategy. Finally, they are unlikely to bear reputation constraints and148
thus they do not need to worry about raising follow-on funds.149
Managers of GVC funds, often civil servants, typically have an extensive experience in retail150
credit sectors, law, audit, and financial analysis. This automatically translates into a selection151
process more akin to the credit risk acceptance. As a consequence, GVC funds are also much152
less streamlined on particular (high growth) industries, and are prone to invest into traditional153
sectors with more stable cash flows. Furthermore, stand-alone GVC funds (see Appendix B.1154
for a background on the Belgian VC Industry and the description of major GVC funds) are155
not used to setting up performance-based compensation structures similar to those of private156
venture capitalists (Manigart et al., 2002). As a consequence, their managers are less likely to157
have incentives to select best possible targets and to put pressure on their portfolio firms and158
maximize the exit value of their investments (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003).159
The combination of these factors should undermine the effectiveness of the selection, moni-160
toring, and control mechanisms. In fact, the overall objectives of GVC funds might be different161
and consist in the regional economic development (which has a longer horizon) and job creation.162
Even though this goal is legitimate, government agents could allocate funds in a less efficient way163
(Lerner, 2010), and approve investments in non-profitable projects (Lerner, 2002b).164
On balance this suggests that the operating mode of PVC funds could lead to a more productive165
resource allocation and consequently to more efficient targets. Therefore our main hypothesis on166
the efficiency of Belgian VC-backed firms suggests that firms backed by PVC funds will be167
more efficient than their peers backed by GVC funds .168
3 Methodology and data169
3.1 Methodological approach170
To measure efficiency, we use slacks-based dynamic data envelopment analysis (DDEA) models171
(Tone and Tsutsui, 2010). Originally, the data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology was172
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designed to evaluate a firm’s productivity with respect to the best firms in a reference group173
(Charnes et al., 1978; Cooper et al., 2007; Cook and Seiford, 2009). The idea of measuring efficiency174
relatively to a benchmark can be traced back to Farrell (1957) and Debreu (1959). One can in175
principle define efficiency as the ability to produce a maximum possible output given a mix of176
inputs. Assuming that the form of the optimal production function is known, an efficient frontier177
of production possibilities for all input mixes can be constructed. The more efficient the firm is,178
the closer it is to the frontier. Unfortunately, the optimal production function is not known. In this179
context, Farrell (1957) suggests to (i) assume a theoretical one, like the Cobb-Douglas production180
function, or (ii) rely on an empirical one based on the "best results observed in practice". DEA181
follows the second venue evaluating the efficiency of firms relative to the "best practices production182
frontier".183
In the seminal paper by Charnes et al. (1978) suggested to measure efficiency of any firm as184
"the maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs subject to the condition that185
similar ratios for every firm be less than or equal to unity". The efficiency of a given firm is then186
measured with respect to the reference set (other sample firms). Within this reference set, DEA187
defines the best performers, which form the efficient frontier and have the efficiency score equal188
to one. Remaining firms are benchmarked relative to this frontier and receive a score between189
0 and 1. This can be illustrated using the following example. If a firm A belongs to the set of190
best performers, there is no firm B in the sample, which can produce more than A, provided that191
the combination of B’s resources is not greater than the combination of resources of A. If B uses192
more resources than A, and achieves higher output levels, then B can belong to the set of best193
performers. But this is only possible if there is no firm C, which produces more than B using194
the same or lesser amount of resources as B, and so on. Obviously, the set of best performers195
will include many firms, but none of them will be "outperforming" one another, because their196
relative efficiencies are equivalent. The DEA efficiency score is in this context a distance measure,197
expressed in percentage terms, indicating how far efficiency-wise a given firm is from the frontier.198
DEA has several advantages over the traditional regression-based models. It allows for the199
concurrent use of multiple inputs and outputs, resulting in a more accurate consideration of pro-200
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ductivity. It draws on the microeconomic theory of firms’ optimizing behavior and in this sense has201
stronger theoretical foundations than accounting ratios, often used in performance studies. Fur-202
thermore, DEA requires no statistical assumptions about the nature of production technologies203
that convert inputs into outputs, which contrasts with other studies that use total factor produc-204
tivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; Harris et al., 2005; Chemmanur et al., 2011) and stochastic205
frontier modeling (Amess, 2003). For this reason DEA models are not subject to the misspecifica-206
tion errors (Gregoriou et al., 2005).207
The advantages of DEA come at some costs. Since the point here is the application of the DEA,208
we discuss the difficulties in the empirical implementation rather than theoretical limitations. First,209
DEA does not allow for the missing data. A more delicate issue is the negativity in the data. As a210
general rule, all input and output data is bound to be nonnegative, although slight modifications211
to account for the negative data are available for some DEA models. Second, there is an important212
trade off in terms of the number of observation units vs. number of inputs/outputs. Having too213
few firms, keeping the number of inputs/outputs fixed, results in too many DMUs being classified214
as efficient. Conversely, having too many firms results in most of them being inefficient with a zero215
score.216
Original DEA models are cross-sectional. Many applications, however, are more insightful217
in a longitudinal context, which is why further theoretical advances have enabled an explicit218
incorporation of the continuous time structure into efficiency measurements (Färe and Grosskopf,219
1996; Chen and van Dalen, 2010). One of the latest developments in this field is the dynamic220
slacks-based measure (DSBM) developed by Tone and Tsutsui (2010). We use the input oriented221
DSBM model to evaluate efficiency over a four year window between the pre-transaction year222
(injection year for startups) T − 1, and three years after the transaction T + 3. To avoid the223
endogeneity issues, inputs are always one year lagged with respect to outputs. Using these models224
enables us to explicitly account for management’s optimizing behavior over time. As a result, for225
each sample firm we observe how efficient (productive) it was over this period in comparison to226
its direct peers. This information is summarized in the global efficiency score. The latter can also227
be decomposed into the term efficiencies (three in our case), which illustrate the path efficiency228
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followed during this period and make it possible to capture the gradual changes in efficiency that229
occur in underlying portfolio firms.230
To assess the implications of the type of financial backer on productivity, we regress the obtained231
cross-section of efficiency scores on variables of interest and a series of controls. All regressions232
use the Wooldridge-Papke estimator for fractional bounded response variables coined by Papke233
and Wooldridge (1996) and particularly suitable for modeling DEA scores. We also implement a234
series of tests for the specification error (RESET) and for the goodness of functional form (GOFF)235
(Ramalho et al., 2011, 2010; Murteira and Ramalho, 2013; Ramalho et al., 2013). Parameters of236
the models are always estimated with robust standard errors.237
3.2 Sample construction238
The empirical setting of this paper is the Belgian VC industry during the period 1998-2007. Our239
country choice is driven by two major rationales. First, the Belgian venture capital industry is quite240
well-developed (Manigart et al., 2002) and has several important well-established GVC players that241
account for about half of VC investments in Belgium during the period under study: SRIW for242
the Walloon region, SRIB for the Brussels region, as well as a dozen local regionalized funds like243
LRM (province of Limbourg), Meusinvest (province of Liège), etc. Some of them (SRIW, SRIB)244
have been present in the industry for a considerable amount of time (more than 30 years). All245
are technically influenced by the policy makers and operate as stand-alone funds.4 One particular246
case is GIMV, which was established as GVC fund in Flanders region and was later privatized.247
Second, the Belgian economy is wide open (exports represent up to 90% of the GDP) and248
consequently reflects the major European trends. Belgium is also a federal country where the249
legal, accounting (compliance), social and fiscal environments are essentially the same during the250
4The action of the policy makers is limited to the definition of the strategic orientations, endowment decisions,
and the monitoring of funds’ activities (often very light and no penalties are applied). Once set up, the funds
generally benefit from a wide autonomy of action. They are all incorporated as commercial companies subject to
public law. Political parties usually have a seat on the board and could affect some more operational decisions.
However, their influence could be possibly counterbalanced by other directors that come from the private sector.
One exception is the Walloon SRIW that operates, beside its classical role of an autonomous GVC fund, as the
financing tool of the Walloon Government. This function is limited to specific cases such as the recapitalization of
distressed financial institutions in September 2008.
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period under study. The effects of the main GVC options while supporting investments in the251
SME segment can thus be measured on a similar basis.252
Data from different secondary sources were combined to construct the raw dataset. We started253
by recording first round VC-backed deals in Belgium using Factiva, various news archives, VC254
funds’ annual reports, press releases, newsletters, and announcements. In order to ensure the255
validity of the observation units, we manually cross-checked, whenever possible, each hit between256
the mentioned sources and Venture Economics, Capital IQ, and/or Bureau Van Dijk’s Zephyr257
databases. Each entry of the raw data contains information on the year of financing round (T ), the258
type of round (we focus on early- and development capital stages only), the target’s identification259
number (VAT number), and the type of sponsor. The total number of unique first time financings260
in this raw dataset is 1030. To verify its completeness, we cross-checked it with the yearbooks of the261
European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA). EVCA collects information262
(on a voluntary basis) directly from investors and disseminates the industry statistics. Although263
we cannot rule out the potential self-reporting bias in EVCA’s data, these reports have been264
extensively used by researchers as the benchmark of Belgian VC population (Manigart et al., 2002;265
Chanine et al., 2007). According to EVCA, the number of Belgian first-round injections during the266
period 1998-2007 was 1162 (EVCA, 1998-2007). Note that these records include replacement and267
turnaround deals, management buyouts and investments in financial & real estate sectors. Our268
set roughly accounts for about 90% of the population described by EVCA. Considering this, we269
believe our data is fairly representative of the Belgian VC industry.270
We recover firms’ annual financial statements, creation dates, and industrial sector codes from271
Bureau Van Dijk’s Bel-first database. Since our focus is on the young entrepreneurial ventures272
we drop firms from financial and real estate sectors, and those that are over ten years old. All273
monetary data was adjusted for inflation (base year 2004). Because of the large amount of missing274
data introduced by Bel-First our final sample, denoted the base sample (BS), consists of 515 VC-275
backed companies (with injection years spanning 1998-2004) for which we have complete data to276
perform all efficiency estimations over complete cycles of 4 years.5 The details about the treatment277
5In earlier versions of the paper, we used a five-year time frame, which is consistent with a median holding period
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of missing data are available in Appendix B.2.278
Panel A of Table 1 presents the broad industry distribution at the two-digit NACE-BEL 2008279
level of the VC-backed firms. In general, investments are heavily concentrated in the high-tech280
and services sectors (more than 50%). Tabulation of the investment patterns categorized by the281
type of investor reveals that this concentration is only relevant for the PVC. GVC funds mostly282
invest in traditional sectors like construction, manufacturing, and HORECA. An intuitive inter-283
pretation might be that public funds having lower knowledge and experience choose targets from284
the traditional industries. This may be also paralleled with the anecdotal evidence that most285
of the members of the investment committees of public funds are former bankers and auditors.286
Consequently, they could have preferences for firms with more stable and secure cash flows. Al-287
ternatively, this structure could also be an illustration of the money-chasing-deals phenomenon288
(Gompers and Lerner, 2000), and/or of the self-selection of high growth potential targets into the289
private and reputable VC companies (Hsu, 2004; Sørensen, 2007).290
Panel B1 displays the first round investment patterns categorized by injection years. As one291
would expect, the first round investments in Belgium followed an increasing trend until the dot-292
com crisis in 2000. Interestingly, while we observe the decline in PVC investments after 2000, it293
is simultaneously accompanied by the growth in GVC funding. This seems to be in line with the294
premise that GVC funds are supposed to be countercyclical and provide capital to SMEs in bad295
times when PVC contract their investments.296
Table 1 HERE297
Productivity patterns can be industry-specific especially considering the differences in the298
capital-intensive and labor-intensive industries. Therefore, and similarly to Chemmanur et al.299
(2011) and Croce et al. (2013), we estimate efficiency separately for each industry sector (2-digit300
level).301
With the BS we can only evaluate efficiency of the treated (i.e. VC-backed) firms. Another302
interesting question is what would be their efficiency when compared to the counterfactual firms. To303
for the EU countries (Cumming et al., 2013) but reduces the sample size. Our analyses yielded results consistent
with findings presented here.
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investigate this second matter, we constructed a sample of control firms using the genetic propensity304
score matching algorithm with 1-to-1 matching without replacement (Diamond and Sekhon, 2012).305
Genetic matching is an iterative goal-seeking process, in which a better post-matching covariate306
balance is the objective. Diamond and Sekhon (2012) present it as the generalization of the307
standard propensity score matching procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Dehejia and Wahba,308
2002).309
A set of possible counterfactuals is required for the implementation of the genetic matching310
algorithm. To construct this set, we started from the entire population of Belgian privately-held311
firms (excluding the VC-backed ones). The procedure goes as follows. Each firm in the BS was first312
matched to its respective industry (3 digits of NACE-BEL 2008 classification). Within a given313
industry, we located the empirical decile to which a focal VC-backed firm belonged. Following314
Barber and Lyon (1996), this decile was defined on the basis of total assets, in the year before the315
venture capital injection took place (T − 1). Next, for a given VC-backed firm, the set of potential316
counterfactuals was defined as the union of the obtained and two adjacent deciles. If the focal firm317
belonged to the first/last decile of its industry then first/last three deciles were taken respectively.318
We repeated this sequence for each VC-backed firm in the BS which gave a large pool of possible319
counterfactuals of similar size in the year immediately prior to VC financing. Finally, we used the320
logistic specification of the following propensity score model to define the matches:321
Pr(VCi = 1|XT−1,i) = βi + β1Fixed assets+ β2Headcount+ β3Value added+ β4Equity+ β5ROA+
+ β6Herfindahl index+ β7Crude efficiency+ β8Fundraising+ β9Investments+
+ β10TS exits+ β11IPO exits+ β12Hightech dummy+Year dummies+ i,
where VCi is the treatment indicator for a firm i. All regressors are measured in the pre-transaction322
year T − 1, and winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. The following section provides formal323
definitions of the variables.324
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3.3 Variables325
3.3.1 Variables for efficiency measurements326
In the logic of DDEA, a decision making unit (i.e., a firm) uses inputs to produce outputs in327
each period. Periods are connected via the links, which can be desirable (profits) or undesirable328
(production waste), free (unconstrained) or fixed (totally constrained). Desirable links are treated329
as outputs, while undesirable links as inputs. Fixed and free links do not enter into efficiency330
score calculation directly but affect it via the constraints set (see Tone and Tsutsui (2010) for the331
discussion). In our analyses of efficiency, we use the input oriented DSBM model with one output,332
two inputs and one desirable link measure.333
We approximate the usual production factors by the number of employees (Headcount) for334
labor and by the net fixed assets (Fixed assets) for capital. Consistent with the premise that335
management should maximize shareholder value, the desirable link measure is the book value of336
equity capital (Equity) defined as the sum of issued capital and all reserves of the firm. Output is337
measured with the value added (Value added) variable computed as annual revenues less costs of338
production (costs of goods sold). We use value added because sales revenues are not a mandatory339
disclosure item for the unlisted firms in Belgium.6 All mentioned measures are commonly used in340
studies on productivity analysis (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; Amess, 2003; Harris et al., 2005;341
Chemmanur et al., 2011; Alperovych et al., 2013; Croce et al., 2013). To avoid extreme values, the342
production factors are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.343
3.3.2 Variables for regression analyses344
The general variable of our interest is a dummy that takes the value of one when a private investor345
injects funds in an entrepreneurial firm at the first financing round (PVC). Note that this variable346
will be equal to one even when public and private investors syndicate. This is not necessarily an347
issue as there are reasons to believe that in such cases the leading role would be borne by the348
6Note that value added can be negative, which poses difficulties for the efficiency estimation. To avoid nega-
tivity in outputs, Tone (2001) suggests replacing the negative items by 1/10 of the smallest positive value of the
corresponding output. We follow this approach and correct negative values of the VA for the efficiency estimations.
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private investor (Lerner, 1994; Lockett and Wright, 2001; Brander et al., 2002).7349
Our data enables us to distinguish between the investments undertaken by major GVC players350
in Belgium - SRIW, the INVESTS, and other GVC investors, which include SRIB (Brussels regional351
fund), LRM (Limbourg regional fund), and some other GVC firms. Corresponding dummies were352
created for each of these cases. For the sake of comparison, we also created the dummy for GIMV353
- a former GVC investor. We also include a dummy for Syndication taking the value of one when354
the deal is syndicated. Another deal-related control that may impact on efficiency changes post-355
financing is the number of financing rounds (Number of rounds) secured by a VC-backed firm after356
the initial capital injection.357
At the firm-level we control for the age at the time of financing (Age), the initial profitability358
(ROA, measured as EBIT over total assets in the pre-injection year), and initial financial leverage359
(Leverage, defined as the sum of financial debt normalized by total assets in the pre-injection360
year). To control for the firms industry’s concentration we construct the Herfindahl index in the361
same way as Chemmanur et al. (2011). Lastly, we include industry controls in the main regression362
models.363
3.3.3 Variables for propensity score matching364
The first VC funding round is defined as a dummy "VC". To estimate the propensity score we365
use several firm and VC industry level covariates all measured in the pre-investment year. The366
net fixed assets, number of employees, value added, shareholders capital, return on assets, and367
Herfindahl index have been already defined above. We add a crude measure of initial efficiency368
(Crude efficiency) computed as the value added over the number of employees.369
The literature identifies several measures of the VC industry conditions as having an impact370
7It is worth noting a growing strand of literature highlighting a positive impact of mixed syndicates by GVC and
PVC investors on various performance measures of VC-backed firms (Cumming and Li, 2013; Brander et al., 2014).
To be sure that rolling mixed syndicates into PVC-backing category does not bias our conclusions we checked the
structure of the syndicated deals in our sample (see also Table 3). There are 82 syndicated first round investments.
69 syndicates are classified as PVC-backed deals. Among 69 PVC-backed syndicated deals, 23 are backed by the
mix syndicates. This is about 4% of the total number of deals. We therefore do not expect our results to be affected
by our special treatment of this mix case. This intuition was confirmed once we rerun our regression models. We
are thankful to the anonymous referee for pointing out this issue.
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on the probability of securing VC financing (Gompers, 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Lerner,371
2002a). To proxy for the overall supply of venture capital, we include the log of the amount of funds372
raised (Fundraising). The demand is approximated by the log of the amount of venture capital373
and growth capital invested (Investments). Next, we control for the heat of the IPO market and374
general exit opportunities with the logs of exit proceeds from trade sales (TS exits), and from IPOs375
(IPO exits). All these variables are defined on a per-portfolio company basis in the year before the376
VC round takes place. Finally, injection year dummies and a high-tech sector dummy are included377
in the propensity score model.378
3.4 Descriptive statistics379
We start with the BS, the summary statistics of which are reported in Table 2. For convenience, we380
first discuss the inputs and outputs and then the regression-related variables. All inputs, link and381
output variables of the VC-backed firms show increasing patterns. For convenience, we also report382
the yearly percentage changes of the time-varying variables. Average net fixed assets grow from383
about e1448k (median of e236k) to e2755k (median of e505k) three years after the transaction.384
Similarly, we find that all VC-backed companies show steady growth in the average (from 9 to 17)385
and median (from 2 to 5) number of employees between the pre-transaction and the second post-386
transaction year. The same patterns are observed for the link variable showing the steady increases387
in shareholder capital on average (from about e1326k to e3453k), and on median (from about388
e245k to e679k). Finally, VC-backed firms demonstrate the increasing value added patterns from389
e327k to e875k (average), and from e56k to e260k (median) three years after the transaction.390
Table 2 HERE391
Table 2 also tabulates the PVC- and GVC-backed firms. It appears that GVC funds back392
roughly half (47%) of the VC-backed firms in Belgium (243 firms out of 515). In terms of fixed393
assets, PVC-backed firms are slightly smaller on average before the VC injection. They overtake394
GVC-backed companies by a low margin in the second year. Median-wise, PVC-backed firms are395
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significantly (as suggested by the non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests) smaller than their GVC-396
backed peers. PVC-backed firms are larger in terms of the headcount and seem to create more jobs397
on average over time. In terms of the output, we find both PVC- and GVC-backed firms standing398
on equal ground on average in the pre-transaction year (future GVC-backed firms produce slightly399
more value added). Both types of firms display a steady growth in the value added variable on400
average and on median. However, the output growth considerably accelerates in PVC-backed401
firms in the second year after the transaction. Firms backed by private investors are also younger402
(average age is 1.81 vs. 2.27), less profitable (average ROA is -0.38 vs. -0.17), and less levered403
(average debt-to-total assets is 0.13 vs. 0.26).404
There are very few statistically significant differences in averages between both types of firms.405
We observe, however, statistically significant differences in the medians of almost all variables406
except for the number of employees.407
Panel B of Table 2 reveals interesting information about the geographical distribution of the408
VC investment flow. Although the global picture is quite balanced (193 investments in Flanders409
region vs. 247 in Walloon region), the PVC/GVC tabulations show that the vast majority of the410
PVC flows to Flanders region (63%) while Walloon region leads in terms of the GVC (82%). It411
confirms the substantial regional heterogeneity in the Belgian venture capital industry.412
The summary of the deal-related variables is reported in Table 3. Consistently with the staging413
and syndication literature, PVC investors syndicate more often (13% vs. only 3% of the total of414
515 firms) and engage in more financing rounds (1.24 vs 1.03) with their portfolio firms (Gompers,415
1995, 1996; Davila and Foster, 2003; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2007). It appears that the most416
active GVC investor is the INVESTS with 196 first round financings. This represents about 38%417
of the total number of 515 investments in Belgium over the period 1998-2004 and accounts for418
more than 75% of GVC-financed companies.419
Table 3 HERE420
The description of the sample created using the propensity score matching procedure is reported421
in Table 4. The combined sample (CS) displays the growth in all productivity-related variables.422
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NVC-backed companies show slowly growing or quite stable levels of the fixed assets, and of the423
headcount. In VC-backed firms these variables grow quite dramatically. At the same time, both424
types of firms increase their shareholders’ capital and output levels between the pre-transaction425
and the third post-transaction years Pre-transaction VC-backed firms appear to be on average426
slightly younger (2 vs. 5.32 years old). Their return on assets is also much lower in comparison427
to their peers (-0.28 vs. -0.22). Finally, untreated firms show more aggressive financing policies,428
with an average debt-to-total asset ratio of 3.45 against 0.19 in the VC-backed firms.429
Table 4 HERE430
The differences in the growth and in the levels of inputs, output, and link measures may affect431
the efficiency estimations through the returns-to-scale (RTS) assumptions, discussed in Banker432
et al. (1984). The developments in DEA methodology have suggested one non-parametric and two433
parametric tests of the RTS assumptions (Banker, 1993, 1996; Banker et al., 2010). Although not434
tabulated here, we have implemented all three of these tests. The results clearly rejected the null435
of the constant RTS assumption (CRS) in favor of the variable one (VRS). In what follows, we436
report the results of the VRS specifications only. Finally, we have analyzed Pearson correlation437
matrices for the BS and CS and found no indication of the potential multicollinearity problems.438
4 Results439
4.1 Efficiency estimations440
Table 5 reports the results of efficiency estimations. In Panels A and B we report the averages of the441
overall efficiency scores and their decomposition into three term efficiencies. Panel C reports the442
brief summary of the three DEA specific difference tests for the categories of our interest(Banker,443
1993; Banker et al., 2010). For brevity, we aggregate the results of the tests by computing the444
average number of significance stars. For example, if results of three tests suggest that a difference445
is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively (***, **, *), we report this difference to be roughly446
significant at 5% (**).447
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Panel A highlights the results for the sample of 515 VC-backed firms. The average efficiency448
level of VC-backed firms over the four-year study window is about 0.56 (56%). Term structure449
reveals that overall efficiency increases over the T − 1 to T +3 period by about 6.4%. The pattern450
of these improvements seems to be volatile and somewhat concave (also shown in Figure 1(a)). The451
tabulation of the GVC- and PVC-backed firms indicates that overall, the latter are more efficient452
than the former by about 10%. This difference is statistically significant at aggregate 1% level. In453
both cases we observe increases in efficiency following the transaction year. PVC-backed firms show454
higher pre-transaction efficiency levels, and demonstrate higher gains of efficiency over the period455
T − 1 to T . These results indicate that PVC firms might choose potentially more efficient firms456
within the pool of candidates for VC financing. At the same time, the difference between PVC-457
and GVC-backed firms in this period is only marginally significant at aggregate 10% level. Both458
types of portfolio companies lose in productivity in the second post-transaction year. The slight459
efficiency growth resumes in the PVC-backed firms afterwards while GVC-backed firms continue460
to lose in productivity. In each post-transaction period, the difference in productivity in PVC-461
and GVC-backed firms is significant at aggregate 1% level.462
Table 5 and Figure 1 HERE463
Panel B and Figure 1(b) report the results of efficiency measurements using the combined sam-464
ple (CS). Global efficiency in the SMEs is about 47%. VC-backed firms lag 7% behind the average,465
and 13% behind their NVC-backed peers in terms of overall productivity over the estimation of466
window. The difference between VC- and NVC-backed firms seems to be only marginally signifi-467
cant at aggregate 10% level (see Panel C). Consistent with our previous results, the difference in468
the overall productivity of PVC- and GVC-funded firms is significant at aggregate 1% level. In469
the combined sample we find no differences in the pre-transaction efficiency levels between these470
two categories. In each post-transaction year, however, the differences are statistically significant471
at 5% or 1% levels. The "underperformance" of VC seems to be caused by GVC. The difference472
in the productivity of GVC- and NVC-backed firms is significant at aggregate 5% level overall.473
PVC-backed firms have almost 50% (0.496) efficiency levels and this is 2% above the average pro-474
20
ductivity score of comparable firms. Interestingly, this difference is not significant (neither are the475
differences in the term efficiencies) suggesting no effect of PVC funding.476
Both panels A & B suggest that INVESTS funds are the culprits of this subpar "performance".477
They seem to choose the least efficient firms and drag down GVC estimates in the post transaction478
years. This may suggest that our results are driven by this investor. We note however that479
INVESTS is a category that regroups a set of various GVC funds that operate independently, and480
that INVESTS are involved in roughly 80% of GVC-backed deals in our sample. We are therefore481
effectively talking about the major bulk of GVC flow. Moreover, in a series of unreported (but482
available upon request) tests we verify that INVESTS-backing significantly differs from that by483
PVC, SRIW, and NVC pre- and post-transaction. At the same time, we found no difference in484
efficiency of firms backed by INVESTS in comparison to those funded by other GVC investors.485
Overall, the evidence is supportive of our main hypothesis. Entrepreneurial firms backed by486
PVC seem to show greater efficiency levels and improvements in comparison to their GVC-backed487
counterparts. Although these results are quite comforting, the casual link between the investor488
type and efficiency is still an open question. To understand this link, we move to multivariate489
regression analyses presented in the following section.490
4.2 Type of investor and its implications on efficiency491
Table 6 reports the regressions estimated using the base sample of 515 VC-backed firms. Column492
(0) provides the results for the zero-model in which only control variables are used. Models (1) to493
(5) test the impact of a respective investor type on the overall efficiency over the study period. The494
R2 is computed following Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Ramalho et al. (2010) as a squared495
correlation between the observed and predicted values of the response. As before, we report GIMV496
estimations for the sake of comparison.497
Model (1) suggests that the presence of private investor in the first financing round has a498
positive and statistically significant (1%) effect on the future efficiency of a portfolio firm. The499
corresponding average partial effect (0.099) implies that the arrival of the PVC investor in the500
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equity of the firm improves productivity by almost 10% (on average) over the three years post-501
transaction. Models (2) to (5) show the results of the similar estimations disentangling the effects502
of different public investors. Model (6) combines all specific public investors and GIMV. As could503
be expected, GIMV has a statistically significant effect on the productivity of its targets. The504
gain in productivity could go as high as 19% (Model (3)), although in the combined model the505
effect is at a 15% level (Model (6)). Conversely, being backed by one of the INVEST funds leads506
to statistically significant destruction of productivity by almost 13%. All regression tests (see the507
p-values) reject the errors in the specifications or functional forms.508
Table 6 HERE509
Table 7 reports the estimations for the combined sample. In accordance with our univariate510
analysis of efficiency, Model (1) reports that in general the presence of a VC investor in the equity511
of the firm has a negative and significant (5%) impact on the subsequent productivity of portfolio512
firms. The economic size of the average partial effect implies a loss of productivity of about 4.2%513
over the study period. The split between different investor types suggests that being financed by514
a PVC investor (Model (2)) has a positive but rather weak (10%) effect. On average, PVC-backed515
firms see their overall efficiency improve by about 3.2%. Models (4) and (5) suggest that GIMV516
backing has a statistical (at the 5% level) and positive economic (12.2%) effect on the dynamic517
productivity while INVESTS-sponsored companies lose about 11.8% on average in efficiency over518
the study period. This latter effect is statistically significant at 1% and is also confirmed in Model519
(7). Again, the regression tests suggest no errors in the specifications or functional forms of the520
models.521
Table 7 HERE522
Overall these findings are again supportive of the hypothesis discussed in Section 2 although523
the combined sample shows that the presence of PVC investors has a very limited effect on the524
post-transaction efficiency. As the efficiency scores can be decomposed into term efficiencies, it is525
also possible to investigate whether the VC investor type effect persists across time. To answer526
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this question we run separate unreported regressions of the term efficiency scores on the variables527
of interest and controls. The results were consistent with our main story.528
4.3 Selection and endogeneity issues529
There may still be some issues related to the endogenous nature of VC funding. To be specific,530
there may be two distinct sorts of biases that apply to BS and CS respectively.531
First, there may be a selection problem in which GVC funds target firms that are systematically532
different along some unobservable characteristics from those financed by PVC funds. If for example533
PVC funds cherry-pick firms with greater growth prospects ex ante, our statement about the benefit534
of PVC ex post is misleading. The same issue would be expected if GVC funds target firms that535
are systematically overlooked by PVC funds. To alleviate this concern, we follow (Chemmanur536
et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013) and use treatment effect models to control for the effect of the537
unobservables. The results are reported in Table 8. The dependent variable for the probit selection538
equation is the PVC-backing. Its specification is similar to the one we used for the propensity score539
matching (see Section 3). There are two slight differences because of the relatively small size of540
the base sample. First, proceeds from IPO exits and trade sale exits were rolled into one "Exits"541
variable. Second, injection year dummies were replaced by the "2000s Dummy" to control for the542
bubble years. The outcome equations have the same specification as in the previously reported543
models for the base sample. Note that DEA score is a proportion falling into [0;1] interval.544
It should therefore be transformed before it is plugged as the dependent variable in the OLS545
outcome equation. We use the arcsin-square-root transform because the usual log-odds transform546
is infeasible in the presence of bound values. All regressions were estimated with robust standard547
errors. Due to the space limitations, only the brief results are reported.548
Panel A shows the answer to the question of "what if" PVC-backed firms were GVC-backed549
and vice versa? The efficiency of GVC-backed firms would have been about 16% higher if they had550
received financing from private VC fund. Similarly, PVC-backed firms would have lost about 7%551
in efficiency if they had been financed by GVC. Both parametric and non-parametric tests suggest552
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these results are statistically significant at 1% level.553
Table 8 HERE554
Second, there may be an endogeneity problem in our analysis of VC- vs. NVC-backed firms.555
This is again related to the potentially different "profile" of firms that secure VC financing com-556
pared to the NVC-backed firms. These ex ante differences may be correlated with ex post perfor-557
mance of the targets. The problem is that we observe these "profiles" only partially. Observable558
differences between treated and control firms are ruled out by the matching procedure (Chemmanur559
et al., 2011). However, heterogeneity along the unobservables could still be an issue. To alleviate560
this concern, we employ the similar switching regression methodology except that we have to go561
back to the entire population of Belgian SMEs. In this context we look at the distinctions between562
the PVC vs. NVC backing, and between the GVC vs. NVC backing. Our first stage regressions563
are two probit models of the same specification and on the same population as we used in the564
propensity score matching procedure. The dependent variable is either PVC- or GVC-backing.565
Corresponding inverse Mills ratios (IMR) are computed for all companies in the population. In566
the second stage we use the NVC-backed firms returned from the matched procedure. This is567
because it is computationally infeasible to estimate efficiency of over 150k firms (the population568
size). Since IMRs are computed using the entire population, the use of the reduced samples in569
the second stage should not be problematic. Second stage regressions are estimated via OLS with570
robust standard errors and have the same specifications as the models reported previously for the571
combined sample.572
The summarized results are reported in Panel B. Productivity of control firms would have573
experienced no change if they had been funded by PVC. NVC-backed firms would have shown574
a drop in productivity of 10% (significant at 1% both in parametric and non-parametric tests)575
if they had secured GVC funding. If PVC-backed firms had not been financed by any sort of576
VC, their productivity might have been better, but the difference is not significant. Finally, it577
appears that if GVC-backed firms had received no funding they would have gained about 7.5% in578
productivity. Again, this improvement is statistically significant at 1% level both in parametric and579
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non-parametric tests. Overall, controlling for the potential unobservable heterogeneity between the580
VC-backed and matched firms, our previous results seem to be confirmed.581
Overall, controlling for the potential unobservable heterogeneity between the VC-backed and582
matched firms, our previous results seem to be confirmed.583
4.4 Comparison with the total factor productivity approach584
Previous research used the total factor productivity (TFP) measure of efficiency in the VC context585
(Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013). It is therefore insightful to see whether our results586
hold against alternative estimation methods.587
Even though this is a useful check in order to relate this study to the existing literature,588
implementing the TFP approach raises a number of issues. To measure the TFP properly, we589
need to estimate the regression of the natural log of output on the natural logs of inputs. The590
output is sales revenues, while the usual inputs are labor and capital. Although we have data on591
the inputs, we lack data on the output measure in this context. As we mentioned elsewhere, in592
Belgium disclosure of sales revenues is subject to a managerial decision. Thus, our first issue is593
that we do not have the complete data on sales in our sample. To estimate the TFP we rely on594
the SYS-GMM procedure described in Blundell and Bond (2000). Following Chemmanur et al.595
(2011) and Croce et al. (2013) we perform a by-industry estimation of the TFP. This gives rise to a596
second issue, since we have to partition the base or combined samples (with already limited number597
of firms) into industry subsets. This leads to a further reduction of the sample size for the TFP598
estimations. We nevertheless use these reduced samples to estimate the TFP. The results, available599
upon request, are materially similar to our main findings and do not change the conclusions of the600
study.601
5 Conclusion602
In this study we analyze the implications of VC financing on the productivity of the entrepreneurial603
firms. Our context is the Belgian venture capital industry. We focus on the relationship between the604
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type of financial backer - government or private - and the productivity of its targets. This question605
is addressed using a unique hand-collected database of Belgian VC-backed firms during the period606
1998-2007. We use Dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis methodology to estimate efficiency levels607
and changes between the first pre-transaction year (T − 1) and three years following the injection608
of venture capital (T + 3).609
Overall the results are suggestive of the following. Within the pool of Belgian VC-backed610
firms, being financed by PVC investors significantly improves efficiency of portfolio companies.611
Being financed by a GVC fund, and in particular by the sub-regional investment companies (the612
"INVESTS"), implies a significant reduction in productivity. SRIW and GIMV have respectively a613
very limited negative and highly positive influence on the post-transaction changes in productivity614
in their targets. Factoring in comparable NVC-backed firms suggests that VC-backing in general615
destroys productivity in Belgium. This, however, comes almost exclusively from the GVC backing,616
especially from the INVESTS. Comparing PVC to NVC backing suggests statistically weak-to-no617
effect of private VC on productivity.618
Our explicit analysis of the investors’ typology on productivity contributes to the ongoing619
debates on the effects of GVC (Cumming and Li, 2013; Brander et al., 2014), and on the effects of620
VC on productivity (Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013). Instead of focusing on output621
measures alone to assess the incremental impact of VC backing on a firm’s success, we dig into the622
causality of this output, namely the efficiency of the production process. We are able to distinguish623
between financial support and value added provided by GVC and PVC investors and underline624
the impact of this distinction on the target’s efficiency. This result is important as the latter itself625
is one of the fundamental drivers of firm’s performance (Bottazzi et al., 2008a).626
At the same time, we are aware about several important limitations of our study. Our dataset627
does not contain crucial fund-related characteristics, such as the age and/or the size of the fund,628
the number of portfolio companies per fund manager to name but a few. In addition, we do629
not have any information on the valuations or shareholding stakes in the deals. This, however,630
would add a lot to our understanding of the effect of the VC financier type on the efficiency of its631
targets. Another limitation is due to the period under study: the INVESTS have been thoroughly632
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reorganized under the cupola of the Sowalfin, and the governance of this myriad of sub-regional633
funds has been subsequently revised since then. Thus, the results of our study must be preferably634
interpreted as a comparative approach of different types of VC organizations for a homogenous635
time period, rather than as a contemporaneous and reliable picture of the VC industry prevailing636
in Belgium at the current time.8637
In spite of the aforementioned limitations, our results are insightful for academic research.638
Analyzing the effects of GVC programs is a challenging task. Therefore, it is beneficial to assess639
this question in many different ways. Considerable attention is paid to the implications of VC640
financing on business creation, growth, innovation, regional development and employment. Our641
results investigate yet another aspect of the firm’s performance and favor the conjecture that,642
in the case of VC, efficiency is also contingent on the financier’s profile. Our results are also643
important for entrepreneurs and for the industry. For small firms, venture capitalists provide more644
than just money but also advice and networks. The quality of the latter is contingent on the645
identity of the investor. Considering this, entrepreneurs should be aware of the implications of this646
investor heterogeneity on their firms’ performance before paying the price. Ultimately, our results647
are potentially useful for Belgian policy makers. Although we do not conclude that their funds648
are harmful for the economy, our evidence suggests that GVC funds’ investments are not helping649
productivity within their targets. This may imply an inefficient use of the taxpayers’ money, which650
is why a reassessment (and possibly in-depth restructuring) of these programs might be warranted.651
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(b) Combined sample.
The graph presents the productivity patterns of Belgian VC-backed firms between the first pre- and third post-transaction years. The
term productivity scores are estimated using the DDEA methodology. For details see Section 3.
Table 1: Industry and investment patterns of the BS.
All VC-backed firms PVC-backed firms GVC-backed firms
N % N % N %
Panel A: Industry patterns - number of firms per industry.
R & D (72) 40 8% 21 8% 19 8%
Manufacturing (12-33) 82 16% 26 10% 56 23%
Construction & Commodities (35-43) 34 7% 6 2% 28 12%
HORECA & Transport (45-56) 83 16% 33 12% 50 21%
IT & Telecom (58-63) 110 21% 84 31% 26 11%
Services (69-71, >73) 166 32% 102 38% 64 26%
Panel B: Time patterns - number of firms per year.
1998 65 35 30
1999 87 55 32
2000 101 69 32
2001 71 39 32
2002 72 32 40
2003 63 19 44
2004 56 23 33








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Deal-related variables.
N % of (1) N % of (1) Mean SD
Panel A: General info
First round investments Syndication Number of rounds
VC-backed firms (1) 515 100% 82 16% 1.142 0.480
PVC-backed firms 272 53% 69 13% 1.239 0.618
GVC-backed firms 243 47% 13 3% 1.033 0.201




Oher GVC 46 9%
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the deal-related variables for the sample of 515
VC-backed firms. For the variable definitions, see Section 3.
Table 8: Treatment effect of private vs. government VC.
Panel A: BS sample.
Mean efficiency of GVC-backed firms Potential efficiency if GVC-backed firms were PVC-backed Difference
0.512 0.673 0.160∗∗∗,+++
Mean efficiency of PVC-backed firms Potential efficiency if PVC-backed firms were GVC-backed Difference
0.608 0.537 -0.071∗∗∗,+++
Panel B: CS sample.
Mean efficiency of NVC-backed firms Potential efficiency if NVC-backed firms were: Difference
0.476 PVC-backed 0.476 0.000GVC-backed 0.377 -0.100∗∗∗,+++
Mean efficiency of PVC-backed firms Potential efficiency if PVC-backed firms were NVC-backed Difference
0.496 0.515 0.019
Mean efficiency of GVC-backed firms Potential efficiency if GVC-backed firms were NVC-backed Difference
0.426 0.502 0.075∗∗∗,+++
The table reports the results of the switching regressions with endogenous switching models for the base and combined samples.
***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance in the t-tests. +++, ++, and + indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance in







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Efficiency regressions using the base sample of 515 VC-backed firms.





Other GVC 0.042 -0.089
Age, T-1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.007 -0.012
ROA, T-1 -0.076*** -0.067** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.062** -0.077*** -0.061**
Leverage, T-1 -0.738*** -0.642*** -0.739*** -0.759*** -0.588*** -0.741*** -0.602***
Herfindahl index, T-1 0.462* 0.422* 0.462* 0.473** 0.294 0.449* 0.333
Number of rounds 0.051 0.016 0.051 0.025 0.018 0.052 -0.005
Syndication 0.063 -0.008 0.064 0.030 0.083 0.061 0.061
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.168 0.202 0.168 0.185 0.226 0.168 0.238
N.obs. 515 515 515 515 515 515 515
RESET1, p-val. 0.133 0.666 0.135 0.363 0.827 0.130 0.706
RESET2, p-val. 0.158 0.819 0.153 0.594 0.893 0.151 0.929
GOFF1, p-val. 0.150 0.651 0.152 0.379 0.812 0.146 0.701







Other GVC 0.015 -0.031
The table reports regressions of efficiency scores on the variables of interest and controls using the base sample of 515
VC-backed firms. Wooldridge-Papke estimator for fractional response variables is used for all models. Coefficients are
estimated with robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance respectively. RESET1,
RESET2, GOFF1, and GGOFF lines provide the p-values of the model specification error tests and functional form
specification error tests (Ramalho et al., 2011, 2010; Murteira and Ramalho, 2013; Ramalho et al., 2013).
Table 7: Efficiency regressions using the combined sample of 1030 firms.






Other GVC -0.049 -0.115
Age, T-1 0.003 -0.006 0.007 0.003 0.004 -0.007 0.003 -0.007
ROA, T-1 -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.110*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.101*** -0.112*** -0.101***
Leverage, T-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
Herfindahl index, T-1 0.588*** 0.582*** 0.580*** 0.592*** 0.591*** 0.504*** 0.593*** 0.521***
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.098 0.103 0.101 0.099 0.102 0.129 0.098 0.133
N.obs. 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030
RESET1, p-val. 0.890 0.665 0.499 0.946 0.964 0.641 0.878 0.695
RESET2, p-val. 0.615 0.854 0.175 0.560 0.559 0.833 0.592 0.682
GOFF1, p-val. 0.919 0.657 0.547 0.979 0.998 0.652 0.908 0.723







Other GVC -0.016 -0.038
The table reports regressions of efficiency scores on the variables of interest and controls using the combined sample of 1030 firms.
Wooldridge-Papke estimator for fractional response variables is used for all models. Coefficients are estimated with robust standard
errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance respectively. RESET1, RESET2, GOFF1, and GGOFF lines provide
the p-values of the model specification error tests and functional form specification error tests (Ramalho et al., 2011, 2010; Murteira
and Ramalho, 2013; Ramalho et al., 2013).
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B Appendix861
B.1 The Belgian venture capital industry862
B.1.1 Global activity over the 1998-2007 decade863
The Belgian venture capital industry is quite well developed (Manigart et al., 2002). It experienced864
a relatively volatile decade over the period from 1998 to 2007. According to the European Private865
Equity & Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and the Belgian Private Equity & Venture Capital866
Association (BVA) statistics, funds raised and invested at the beginning of the decade had, until867
the year 2000, been on the increase. More than e645 million was raised in the industry that year.868
In the following year, according to the EVCA, the fundraising fell to as low as e134 million. No869
apparent reason was given in the yearbooks about this drop. Note that during this period EVCA870
did not provide data by fund stage focus, thus we are unable to distinguish which funds were871
raised for buyout purposes and which for VC investing. The fundraising gradually grew to about872
e210 million in 2004, followed by another drop in 2005 to e120 million. The amount of funds873
raised in 2006 skyrocketed to e614 million and fell again to e144 million in 2007. During its best874
year (2006), the size of the industry roughly accounted for 0.299% of the GDP (according to the875
industry statistics). The major sources of these funds in 2001 were the government agencies and876
banks (more than 90%). This proportion gradually decreased to 55% in 2007.877
The total amount of funds invested in 1998 was e258 million. Almost half (about 46%) of878
these investments were made by the public sector. Investments flourished in the following year879
rising to as high as e670 million. After this peak, they gradually declined to about e193 million880
in 2005. The years 2006-2007 showed some surprising jumps in investments - e940 million in 2006881
and more than e1 billion in 2007. Interestingly, the EVCA statistics show that the public sector’s882
share of total VC investments, in terms of amounts invested, sharply declined from 48% in 2002 to883
about 8% in 2003, and slumped to about 2% in 2007. No reason was provided in the yearbooks to884
explain this variation. All these figures should be regarded with caution, since the EVCA compiled885
them based on the information disclosed by its members. This disclosure is non-mandatory, hence886
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may not be fully accurate.887
As for the distribution of Belgian VC investments by sector during the sample period, the888
major portion of the invested funds is directed to the consumer goods, retail, and services sectors889
(around 26% on average between 1998 and 2007). The second largest sector is business and890
industrial products & services (20%), followed by the life sciences and biotechnology (15%). The891
biotech investments were dominant in 2005 (34%) whereas in later years there has been a shift892
towards more traditional sectors.893
B.1.2 Structure of the venture capital playing field894
Belgium is characterized by a fairly high proportion of investments made by public funds. Two big895
categories of public funds can be distinguished: (i) the regional funds (SRIB, SRIW, PMV, and896
formerly, GIMV), and (ii) the local reconversion funds (in the old-fashioned industrial basins).897
In the wake of post-WWII measures aiming at modernizing the Belgian economy, the center-left898
government created a public fund in 1962 - the National Investment Company (NIC) - in order899
to alleviate the difficulty of smaller businesses to access financing sources, especially bank loans900
(Bayenet, 1996). Ten years later, in response to the global oil crisis, the NIC received considerable901
additional means from the state.902
However, divergent views appeared soon between booming Flanders, where most of the multi-903
national companies were established, and declining Wallonia, confronted with the rapid decline of904
its coal and steel industries. The situation ended up with the regionalization of economic compe-905
tencies in 1979 and the consequent split of the NIC into two regional funds: SRIW in Wallonia906
and GIMV in Flanders. The Brussels counterpart (SRIB) was incorporated five years later along907
with the decision to create a third region (Brussels-Capital).908
As a reaction to the dramatic job losses in the coal and steel industries in the early eighties, the909
regions set up local investment funds dedicated to the reconversion of the old industrial sectors.910
One fund in Flanders (Limbourg) and three funds in Wallonia (Liège, Charleroi and Walloon911
Brabant) were initiated. These local funds (the so-called "INVESTS") are public-private structures912
receiving their financial means from the regions. Their commitment is limited to e1.25 million per913
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investment in a local SME (provided the company is not linked to a larger group). According to the914
then prevailing "compensation principle" (a principle that implies that whenever one sub-region915
receives financing or other benefits from the regional or federal governments, other sub-regions916
have to receive an equivalent "compensation", i.e. funding, from the authorities), five additional917
local investment structures were created in 1988 and 1989 in the other non-industrial Walloon918
areas (in West and Central Hainaut, in the provinces of Namur and Luxembourg and in the919
German-speaking part of Walloon region).920
From the beginning, SRIW and SRIB on the one side and GIMV and the others took different921
paths. Due to financial constraints, the Flemish policy-makers decided not to support local com-922
panies and industries if they had not proven their businesses to be viable. In the same vein, the923
limitation of the endowments to the GIMV itself - while keeping the same policy targets - implied924
three major consequences. First, the GIMV had to become more self-sufficient, i.e. generate more925
cash flows by increasing efficiency in screening and in managing participations (hands-on) and by926
achieving a higher portfolio turnover (shorter period of investment). In order to do so, GIMV927
recruited new team members with a mix of entrepreneurial and consulting profiles. Along with928
these initiatives, GIMV decided to liquidate lame ducks from its portfolio at high cost. Secondly,929
the lower government’s commitment needed to be compensated by private funds. With this aim in930
mind, GIMV sought leverages from private investors - especially foreign funds - through syndica-931
tions. As a consequence, GIMV investment managers were asked to develop international contacts932
and strengthen the legitimacy of GIMV on the international markets. Finally, it resorted to new933
sources of funds by becoming listed on the Brussels stock exchange. The interplay of these factors934
gradually transformed GIMV into essentially a private VC fund.935
Unlike the Flemish Government and the GIMV, the Walloon and the Brussels Governments936
have until now maintained the three original strategic goals of SRIW and SRIB: (i) financing937
the growth of companies, (ii) supporting business creation, and (iii) carrying-on interventions on938
the government’s behalf. SRIW was organized in multiple funds according to the industries they939
addressed, resulting in quite a complex structure.940
The boom of internationally oriented local SMEs combined with the creation of a second market941
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at the Brussels stock exchange, and a fiscally favorable business environment (no capital gains tax)942
led to the establishment of the first private funds in Belgium in the mid-eighties. These funds were943
mainly set up by the initiative of large domestic banks (KBC’s Investco, Générale de Banque’s944
VIV, and Synerfi) and big foreign funds (Advent, Benevent and Euroventures). Unfortunately, the945
momentum was soon lost with the economic collapse of Black Monday (October 1987). Public946
funds found themselves in a quasi-monopolistic situation again, until the mid-nineties. During947
that period, direct public investment was significantly increased, especially in Limburg and in the948
Walloon provinces, through the local "INVESTS".949
The second half of the nineties saw the advent of a new wave of private funds on the market,950
encouraged by local investors and operating through the classic VC dual structures. These new951
funds (Trustcapital, Creafund, E-Capital, FLV Fund, etc.) were more focused on early stages952
(technology start-ups) and on firms located in Flanders. In Wallonia, this role was played by the953
local "INVESTS". The resulting VC market made ambitious projects possible such as Telenet954
(now the largest Flemish telecom operator) or Devgen (health care company located in Ghent,955
now called Syngenta).956
The burst of the Internet bubble in the early 2000s abruptly interrupted the VC market growth.957
A large number of the second-generation funds simply went off the radar while others, better capi-958
talized, barely managed to survive. In such a context, during the first part of the decennia, public959
funds supplied most of the investments in SMEs. In this context, the Walloon Regional Govern-960
ment decided to sort out the various overlapping and competing activities of the public funds.961
This was achieved by implementing strict investment rules and by placing the local "INVESTS"962
under the guardianship of an umbrella structure, the Sowalfin, in 2002.963
All Belgian public funds now operate simultaneously as equity and debt providers. Aside from964
the classical long-term loan packages, public funds also provide convertible and subordinated debt965
facilities. No precise figures are published about any breakdown of the funds used, neither about966
their returns. It is assumed that loans are increasingly preferred to equity as public funds are967
required to take only minority participations in companies. In many cases, it has been proven968
difficult for them to plan for any exit of their stakes. Consequently, vast amounts of money have969
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sometimes been trapped in portfolio companies for very long periods of time.970
The public funds are usually poorly capitalized. Their main source of funds comes from drawing971
rights granted by the regional authorities. A recent (and probably imprecise) estimation of the972
financial resources of the Belgian public funds was conducted by the SRIB in 2011 at the request973
of the Brussels regional authorities. As such, SRIB reports that Flemish public funds manage a974
total of e1038 million (0.50% of the regional GDP in 2011), split between LRM (e247 million)975
and PMV (e791 million). At the same time, Brussels’s own public VC fund disposes of about976
/euro 161 million (0.23% of the regional GDP in 2011). Finally, the Walloon region has a total of977
e1690 million available (1.96% of the regional GDP in 2011) split between SRIW (e963 million),978
"INVESTS" (e625 million), and CIW (Caisse Wallonne d’Investissement, e102 million). The979
Walloon Region has created two additional investment vehicles that are not taken into account980
in the present paper. The first one is Sowalfin, created in 2002 primarily involved in providing981
guarantees on bank loans granted to SMEs (e167 million). The second is the Sogepa fund, which982
operates on behalf of the Walloon Government in the distressed company segment (e177 million).983
B.2 Treatment of the missing data984
Bel-first introduces a considerable amount of missing data in our sample. This is problematic for985
the DEA methods as they require a balanced panel data structure. One of the reasons for this986
N/A issue is that startups are allowed to report first-time financial statements after more than987
twelve months. If this occurs it creates a missing item for the creation year. In such cases we988
correct the first-year items on a pro-rata basis.989
Liquidated, bankrupt, or completely sold out companies also result in N/A data for the corre-990
sponding observations. Roughly, these cases correspond to the exits by venture capital investors of991
their stakes. Remember that our analyses are related to the T − 1/T +3 time window around the992
transaction date T . Therefore the missing data issue is only relevant for the data points within this993
interval. We consequently checked the exits occurring before the end of the third post-transaction994
year. Three targets were exited and twenty five were liquidated in a bankruptcy procedure during995
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the period T − 1/T + 3. This amount constitutes a negligible proportion of less than 2% of the996
total number of firms in the raw sample. All remaining firms may have gone bankrupt or been997
exited after T + 3 year.998
Finally, we noted that Bel-first reproduces accounting items as is. This means that if a company999
reports a zero or blank field for a given item (e.g., financial debt), Bel-first records them in the same1000
way, leading to another N/A issue. We thus manually investigated the structure of such missing1001
data together with the status of the sample firms. It appeared that all the companies concerned1002
were reported as active. In addition to that, the missing/blank patterns proved to be unsystematic1003
from one variable to another. Therefore, for the unambiguous cases, we safely inferred zero values1004
out of blanks. Whenever it was not possible, we used a conservative approach, in which we allowed1005
one blank data point per variable. If it occurred on the bounds of the [T − 1, T + 3] interval, we1006
used a simple trend line to forecast its value. If it occurred within the stated bounds, we averaged1007
two adjacent non-missing data points to substitute for the blank item.1008
After applying all these filters and corrections, our final sample, denoted the base sample (BS),1009
consists of 515 VC-backed companies, for which we have complete data to perform all efficiency1010
estimations.1011
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